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WHO TEACHES CONSTITUTIONAL LAW? 
Deborah Jones Merritt* 
Constitutional Law is a plum teaching assignment. William 
L. Prosser, then Dean of the University of California School of 
Law at Berkeley, complained more than forty years ago that 
"[t]he overwhelming majority" of teaching applicants "have 
wanted to teach Constitutional Law."1 More recently, a survey 
of constitutional law professors established that 130 of 134 
professors taught the course by their own choice; only four 
professors had succumbed to institutional pressure to teach con-
stitutional law.2 
There are a variety of reasons for the appeal of constitu-
tional law. The subject raises provocative, highly publicized is-
sues that are basic to our legal system. Topics for scholarly 
articles abound, and some professors believe that law review edi-
tors favor articles on constitutional topics.3 Professors of consti-
tutional law also have opportunities to enhance their reputations 
by arguing high profile cases before state and federal courts or by 
testifying before government bodies. Even if they do not partici-
pate actively in litigation, their words and theories often pene-
trate judicial opinions. 
But who gets to teach this popular, influential course? Do 
academic credentials or work experience make some professors 
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Professor of Law and Professor of Wo-
men's Studies, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. B.A. 1977, Harvard Univer-
sity; J.D. 1980, Columbia University. I collected the data for this study together with 
Barbara F. Reskin, Professor and Chair, Department of Sociology, The Ohio State Uni-
versity. Professor Reskin also provided invaluable suggestions on a draft of this paper. I 
am further indebted to our research assistants-Katherine Eubank, Michelle Fondell, 
Maret Olson, and Wayne Santoro-for their help in building the data base for this study. 
1. William L. Prosser, Advice to the Lovelorn, 3 J. Legal Educ. 505, 508 (1951). 
Prosser also fingered administrative law as a popular teaching assignment in that heyday 
of post-war regulation. These two courses, Prosser complained, were "a drug on the law 
school market" that "skimmed the cream of the crop, the pick of the younger genera-
tion," leaving courses like criminal law, evidence, and civil procedure without distin-
guished scholars. Id. 
2. George D. Haimbaugh, Jr., The Teaching of Constitutional Law in American 
Law Schools, 31 J. Legal Educ. 38, 56 (1981). 
3. To the best of my knowledge, no empirical study has tested this speculation. At 
the very least, however, teachers of constitutional law have an edge in publishing articles 
in the esteemed journal, Constitutional Commentary. 
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more likely to teach constitutional law than others? Is constitu-
tional law the exclusive province of professors who have clerked 
for Supreme Court Justices? Do race and sex affect teaching as-
signments in constitutional law? 
As part of a larger empirical study of law school hiring, I 
analyzed variables such as these to determine what factors in-
creased the odds that a recently hired professor would teach con-
stitutional law. The study included 1046 professors who began 
tenure-track positions at accredited U.S. law schools between the 
fall of 1986 and the spring of 1991.4 In this essay, I briefly de-
scribe the study's methodology and principal findings related to 
the teaching of constitutional law. I then offer some comments 
about the implications of these findings for the way scholars 
teach constitutional law and contribute to constitutional 
jurisprudence. 
I. STUDY DESIGN 
Using five successive editions of the AALS Directory of Law 
Professors,5 I identified 1094 professors who began tenure-track 
positions at accredited U.S. law schools between the fall of 1986 
and spring of 1991.6 These 1094 professors comprised the entire 
population of professors who started tenure-track positions dur-
ing that period. I focused on this group of recent tenure-track 
entrants in order to analyze contemporary trends in law school 
4. The total population of professors beginning tenure-track positions during that 
period numbered 1094. I excluded 48 professors from the analyses described in this pa-
per, because I lacked information about the courses they taught. See infra note 8 and 
accompanying text. 
5. The Directory, published annually by the Association of American Law Schools, 
contains a comprehensive list of all full-time faculty members at accredited U.S. law 
schools. Several other empirical studies have relied upon the Directory to identify faculty 
members at accredited law schools. See, e.g., Donna Fossum, Law Professors: A Profile 
of the Teaching Branch of the Legal Profession, 1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 501; Robert J. 
Borthwick and Jordan R. Schau, Note, Gatekeepers of the Profession: An Empirical Pro-
file of the Nation's Law Professors, 25 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 191 (1991). 
6. There were 178 accredited law schools between 1986 and 1991. I excluded four 
of these schools from my analysis: three Puerto Rican schools that are not part of the U.S. 
law teaching labor market and one school (the Judge Advocate General's School of the 
U.S. Army) that draws its faculty exclusively from military officers. In both of these 
cases, the applicant pool for faculty positions differs considerably from the pool for other 
accredited schools. 
I defined "tenure track" professors as those with the titles assistant professor, associ-
ate professor, acting professor (at University of California law schools), or professor. I 
excluded visiting or adjunct professors, librarians, clinical professors, and professors of 
legal writing from the population because their status and/or credentials differ signifi-
cantly from those of the other professors in the population. For a more detailed discus-
sion of how I defined the research population, see Deborah J. Merritt and Barbara F. 
Reskin, The Double Minority: Empirical Evidence of a Double Standard in Law School 
Hiring of Minority Women, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2299, 2302-05 (1992). 
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hiring and teaching assignments. After identifying the relevant 
population, I obtained biographical data for each of the profes-
sors from the Directory, other published sources, and resumes I 
solicited from the professors.7 
For the analyses described in this paper, I excluded from the 
research population forty-eight professors for whom I lacked in-
formation about teaching assignments. The remaining 1046 
professors listed at least one teaching assignment on their re-
sume, in the Directory, or in some other published source.8 From 
these listings, I determined whether each professor had any expe-
rience teaching constitutional law. If a professor had ever taught 
a course in this field, I coded the professor as positive for my 
dichotomous dependent variable, teaching constitutionallaw.9 
In searching for the factors that would predict whether re-
cently hired faculty members taught constitutional law, I tested 
twenty-eight independent variables. These variables included 
most of the academic credentials and work experiences thought 
to affect law school hiring: prestige of the J.D. school;w law re-
7. I also obtained survey responses from more than seventy percent of the popula-
tion. These responses identified both the professors' family ties and the geographic con-
straints they imposed on their academic job searches. Analysis of these variables, 
however, revealed that they bore no significant relationship to whether faculty members 
taught constitutional law; thus I do not discuss the survey responses in this article. For 
further discussion of family ties, geographic constraints, and their relationship to law 
school hiring, see Deborah J. Merritt, Barbara F. Reskin and Michelle Fondell, Family, 
Place, and Career: The Gender Paradox in Law School Hiring, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 395 
(1993). 
8. I gathered the vast majority of teaching assignments from the 1990-91 edition of 
the AALS Directory. If a professor had left teaching before 1990-91, I noted teaching 
assignments from the most current Directory in which the professor's name appeared. 
Some professors reportedly do not keep current the teaching assignments they list in 
the Directory. Other professors may change their entries from year to year, omitting 
some courses and adding others. The potential impact of these differences on my analy-
ses was relatively slight because members of the research population had only one to five 
years of teaching assignments to report. More important, there is no reason to suspect 
that any failure to report teaching assignments correlates with any of the independent 
variables I studied in my analyses. The possible random error generated by a faculty 
member's failure to report courses accurately is accounted for by the statistical signifi-
cance tests I employed. See infra note 20. 
9. I counted courses with the word "constitutional" in the title (including courses 
on state constitutional law) as constitutional law courses. I also counted courses focusing 
on specific parts of the Constitution, such as courses on the First Amendment, Fourteenth 
Amendment, Freedom of Speech, Equal Protection, or Religion Clauses. I excluded 
courses on civil rights statutes and criminal procedure from the tally of constitutional law 
courses; most academics consider these distinct fields. 
10. I measured prestige of the J.D. school by combining two independent measures 
of institutional prestige: The 1992 academic reputation rank reported by U.S. News and 
World Report (The Best Graduate Schools, U.S. News & World Rep., Mar. 23, 1992, at 78) 
and the median LSAT of first-year students enrolled at each law school during the 1991-
92 school year. I combined these highly correlated scores into a single prestige scale that 
ranges from a low of -4.81 (for Texas Southern University) to a high of 4.03 (for both Yale 
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view membership and editorial positions;n possession of a 
master's degree in law; possession of a master's degree in a field 
other than law; possession of a doctoral degree in a field other 
than law; experience as a law clerk for a state appellate court 
(including both state supreme courts and intermediate appellate 
courts), federal district court, federal court of appeals, or the 
United States Supreme Court;tz and experience in nine types of 
law practice.B I also controlled for the professor's age at the 
time of the first tenure-track appointment; the year of the first 
tenure-track appointment;t4 the professor's sex;ts the professor's 
University and the University of Chicago). For a more extensive discussion of how I 
created this prestige scale, see Merritt, Reskin and Fondell, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. at 409-10 
(cited in note 7). 
11. I created four dummy variables to measure law review memberships and edito-
rial positions. One variable indicated whether the professor had served as a named editor 
(i.e., "articles editor," "notes editor," or "editor-in-chief') on the main law review at his 
or her school; a second variable distinguished professors who had served as a staff mem-
ber or general editor, but not a named editor, on the main review; a third variable indi-
cated whether the professor had been a named editor of a secondary review; and a fourth 
variable designated professors who had been a staff member or general editor on a secon-
dary review. A professor with more than one of these experiences received a positive 
code for the most prestigious experience (i.e., the one appearing first in the above list). 
Creating dummy variables in this manner allowed me to measure the effect of each varia-
ble with reference to a fifth group, faculty members with no law review experience. 
12. As with law review experience, I created a dummy variable for each of these 
clerkship experiences. A faculty member with more than one clerkship received a posi-
tive code for the most prestigious clerkship (i.e., the last one named in the list given in 
text). 
13. The nine types of legal experience included in my analyses were solo practice, 
law firm practice, legal aid work, public defender positions, prosecutorial positions, other 
types of government practice, in-house work for a corporation, public interest practice 
other than legal aid or public defender jobs, and nonteaching positions (usually research 
jobs) at foundations or academic institutions other than law schools. Faculty members 
with more than one type of legal experience were coded positive for each type of experi-
ence they listed. 
14. This variable allowed me to control for seniority within the population of rela-
tively junior professors I studied. 
15. Professors may designate their sex in the AALS Directory. If the professor did 
not designate sex, and sex was not apparent from the professor's first name, I called the 
professor's school to determine sex. 
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race,t6 and a sex-race interaction.17 Finally, I controlled for the 
prestige of the school at which the professor obtained his or her 
first tenure-track appointment,ts and for whether the professor 
was "inbred" (employed at the same school from which he or she 
obtained a J.D.).l9 
In the section that follows, I describe some of the statistically 
significant differences between professors of constitutional law 
and professors of other subjects.2o I also report the results of 
16. The AALS Directory allows professors to designate themselves as members of a 
minority racial group. The survey I mailed to population members, see supra note 7, also 
requested information about race and ethnicity. Because the AALS Directory does not 
distinguish minority professors by specific racial or ethnic groups, and because the 
number of professors in most of those groups was quite small, I coded professors as either 
white or minority for this study. According to the survey results, approximately 11.4% of 
the recently hired professors were African-American; 2.6% were Latino or Latina; 1.2% 
were Asian-American; and 0.3% were Native American. 
Different minority groups may have widely divergent experiences in law school 
teaching. In a future study, when members of some minority groups are more widely 
represented on law faculties, I hope to separate the experiences of these minority groups. 
17. A sex-race interaction term allows analysts to determine whether the effects of 
sex and race operate in combination to influence the dependent variable (here, teaching 
constitutional law) differently than the sum of their separate independent effects. Thus, 
the sex-race interaction reveals whether the effect of sex differs for minorities and nonmi-
norities (or whether the effect of minority status differs for men and women). With all 
three variables (sex, race, and the sex-race interaction) in the regression equation, I could 
distinguish the experiences of minority women, white women, minority men, and white 
men. 
18. To measure prestige of the hiring institution, I used the same prestige scale 
designed for measuring prestige of the J.D. school. See supra note 10. I controlled for 
prestige of the employing institution because of a concern that some professors might 
accept a position at a less prestigious school in order to garner an assignment teaching 
constitutional law. 
19. Previous analyses have suggested that inbred professors are treated somewhat 
differently than professors hired from outside a school's own graduates. See Donna Fos-
sum, Women Law Professors, 1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 903, 907-11; Lowell L. Hargens 
and Grant M. Farr, An Examination of Recent Hypotheses about Institutional Inbreeding, 
78 Am. J. Soc. 1381 (1973). 
My preliminary analyses also tested for one other variable: election to Order of the 
Coif during law school. This variable did not correlate significantly with teaching consti-
tutional law, either when analyzed independently or when subjected to multiple regres-
sion analysis. I omitted the variable from my subsequent analyses because the large 
number of cases with a missing value for this variable hampered some of the statistical 
analyses. The large number of missing values arose because many law schools, including 
several of the most prestigious schools, do not participate in Coif. 
After eliminating Coif from the analyses, I lacked any direct measure of law school 
grades, a factor thought to affect law school hiring (and, perhaps, assignments teaching 
constitutional law). I did, however, control for several factors (especially law review 
membership and judicial clerkships) strongly correlated with law school grades. See Mer-
ritt and Reskin, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 2350 (cited in note 6). If law school grades affect the 
likelihood that a professor will teach constitutional law, that relationship should be re-
flected in the regression coefficients for law review membership and judicial clerkships. 
20. Social scientists use tests of statistical significance to gauge the likelihood that 
results observed in their data (such as differences between professors of constitutional 
law and professors of other subjects) reflect real patterns in the underlying population 
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several regression analyses using constitutional law as the depen-
dent variable. As I explain further below, multiple regression al-
lowed me to probe the relationship between each independent 
variable and my outcome (teaching constitutional law) while si-
multaneously holding other independent variables constant. 
II. RESULTS 
One hundred sixty-one of the professors who began tenure-
track teaching jobs between 1986 and 1991 taught a constitu-
tional law course during that period. This group constituted fif-
teen percent (15.4 o/o) of the total number of professors who 
entered the tenure track and reported course assignments during 
those years. The constitutional law professors in my population 
were significantly more likely than other members of the re-
search population to be male, to have served as the editor of a 
main law review, to have graduated from a prestigious law 
school, to have clerked for a U.S. Supreme Court Justice or fed-
eral court of appeals judge, and to have worked for a public in-
terest employer. Professors of constitutional law also appeared 
to have more seniority than other professors.21 Conversely, 
these professors of constitutional law were significantly less likely 
than other professors to have worked for private law firms. Ta-
ble 1 summarizes most of these differences.22 
rather than random errors in sampling, measurement, or coding. Rarely, if ever, do social 
scientists have complete information on the universe they are studying and absolute con-
fidence that no random process affected their data. As a result, any inference from one's 
data to the underlying universe involves the risk that the results in the data do not hold 
for the underlying population. The theory of statistical significance allows social scientists 
to decide on the level of risk they are willing to take in making an incorrect inference 
from their data to the underlying universe. By convention, social scientists treat relation-
ships that have a probability of resulting from chance that is five percent or less (a S.05); 
as "statistically significant" or "statistically reliable." In other words, they tolerate no 
more than a five percent probability that random processes in sampling, measurement, or 
coding could have produced the observed result. See generally Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., 
Social Statistics 115 (McGraw Hill, 2d ed. 1979). 
I follow the same convention, designating significant results as those meeting the .05 
significance level. I also note when a result approaches the conventional significance 
level (as .10). Such results are not as reliable as results meeting the conventional.05 test, 
but they indicate possible differences in the population. When sample size is small, coeffi-
cients must be large to attain the conventional significance level, so a result that ap-
proaches significance (a S .10)-especially one that is consistent with other significant 
results-is worth noting. 
21. This difference merely approached significance (aS .10). See supra note 20 for a 
discussion of results that approach significance at the conventional .05 level. 
22. The table does not include the difference between these two groups of profes-
sors in seniority or in the prestige of the J.D. school, because those differences cannot be 
expressed in percentages. Professors teaching constitutional law began teaching, on aver-
age, in a slightly earlier year (87.9) than other recent hires (88.1). Professors of constitu-
tional law graduated from law schools with a mean score of 2.83 on the law school 
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Table 1 
Percentages of Constitutional Law Professors and Other 
Professors With Selected Characteristics* 
Characteristic 
Male 
Editor of Main Law Review 
Supreme Court Clerk 
Court of Appeals Clerk 
Public Interest Experience 
Law Firm Experience 
Number in Category 
Constitutional Law 
Professors 
72.7% 
36.0% 
9.4% 
33.3% 
9.6% 
52.9% 
161 
* All differences statistically significant (a ~ .05) 
Other 
Professors 
59.8% 
24.4% 
3.4% 
19.0% 
5.5% 
64.7% 
885 
These comparisons are instructive, but they do not control 
for interrelations among the variables. For example, are men 
more likely than women to teach constitutional law because they 
have better credentials than the women? Or does sex itself, after 
controlling for credentials, affect a professor's likelihood of 
teaching constitutional law? 
In order to answer questions like these, I used logistic re-
gression analysis. Logistic regression is a type of multiple regres-
sion, a tool that allows researchers to estimate the independent 
(or "partial") effect of each of several independent variables 
(such as being female or clerking for a Supreme Court Justice) 
on a dependent variable (in this case, teaching constitutional 
law).23 A partial regression coefficient estimates the effect of a 
variable on the outcome when all other variables are held con-
stant. Multiple regression thus is an effective means of determin-
ing whether variables such as sex affect the opportunity to teach 
constitutional law, regardless of other variables (such as aca-
demic credentials or work experience). 
My regression analysis, reported in Table 2, reveals that five 
variables enjoyed a significant relationship with teaching consti-
tutional law-after controlling for other variables in the equa-
prestige scale, while other professors graduated from schools with a mean score of only 
2.41. See supra note 10 for a description of the prestige scale. 
23. For the analyses reported in this paper, I used logistic regression rather than the 
more common ordinary least squares method. The dichotomous outcome analyzed 
here-whether or not a professor taught constitutional law-violates some of the assump-
tions of ordinary least squares regression. For a dichotomous outcome, logistic regression 
is the appropriate tool. See John H. Aldrich and Forrest D. Nelson, Linear Probability, 
Logit, and Probit Models 13-14, 24-30 (Sage Publications 1984). 
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tion.z4 Clerking for a Supreme Court Justice or federal court of 
appeals judge significantly enhanced the likelihood that a profes-
sor would teach constitutional law. Likewise, graduation from a 
prestigious law school was significantly associated with teaching 
this subject. Law firm experience significantly depressed the 
chances that a faculty member would teach constitutional law, 
and being female also had a significant negative effect on teach-
ing constitutional law. Even after controlling for credentials, ex-
perience, and other personal factors, women were significantly 
less likely than men to teach this popular course.zs 
Two other variables displayed a positive association to 
teaching constitutional law that approached the conventional sig-
nificance level.26 Professors who had been a named editor of the 
main law review at their J.D. school were more likely to teach 
constitutional law than professors with no law review experience. 
And faculty members with experience clerking for state appellate 
court judges, on either the state's highest court or an intermedi-
ate appellate court, also appeared more likely to gamer assign-
ments teaching constitutional law. 
One variable, finally, had a negative relationship with teach-
ing constitutional law that approached significance: professors 
who entered the tenure track more recently were less likely to 
teach this course. Seniority, in other words, may have increased 
the likelihood that a professor taught constitutional law. 
Twenty other variables showed no signficant relationship to 
teaching constitutional law. Age and race were not significant. 
Nor did the effect of sex differ significantly between minorities 
and nonminorities.27 District court clerks were no more likely to 
24. This regression analysis included only 985 professors, rather than the full 1046 
professors for whom I had information about teaching assignments, because I lacked data 
on one or more variables for the other 61 professors. Excluding the latter professors from 
the analysis is consistent with recommended techniques for logistic regression. See SPSS 
Advanced Statistics User's Guide 68 (SPSS, 1990). 
25. The negative relationship between being female and teaching constitutional law 
may represent a recent change in the teaching assignments of women on law faculties. 
When Donna Fossum analyzed law professors teaching during the 1975-76 academic year, 
she found that women were proportionately more likely than men to teach constitutional 
law. Fossum, 1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J. at 912 (cited in note 19). Fossum's study, how-
ever, did not use regression analysis to control for possible differences in the credentials 
of men and women. Fossum also included both civil rights and discrimination law within 
"constitutional law." Id. It is difficult to tell, therefore, whether Fossum's results reveal a 
true historical difference in the opportunities for women to teach constitutional law or a 
difference in reporting and analytic methods. 
26. For an explanation of results that approach the conventional significance level, 
see supra note 20. 
27. The sex-race interaction, in other words, was not significant. See supra note 17 
for an explanation of this variable. 
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Table 2 
Logistic Regression for Teaching Constitutional Law 
Variable 
JD Prestige 
Main Law Review Staff 
Main Law Review Editor 
Secondary Law Review Staff 
Secondary Law Review Editor 
LLM 
MA 
PhD 
Supreme Court Clerkship 
Court of Appeals Clerkship 
District Court Clerkship 
State Appellate Clerkship 
Law Firm Experience 
Solo Practice 
Public Defender 
Prosecutor 
Government Work 
Public Interest Work 
Research Job 
Corporate Counsel 
Legal Aid 
Prestige of Tenure-Track Institution 
Inbred 
Tenure-Track Year 
Age 
Female 
Minority 
Female-Minority Interaction 
N 
* Statistically significant (a :5 .05). 
** Approaches significance (a :5 .10). 
Coefficient 
.16* 
.19 
.51** 
.16 
.10 
.13 
- .22 
.25 
1.34* 
.80* 
.06 
.68** 
- .66* 
- .54 
-1.05 
.20 
- .04 
.41 
.28 
- .62 
- .23 
- .10 
- .42 
- .11 ** 
- .00 
- .52* 
.35 
.03 
985 
teach constitutional law than professors without clerkships, and 
practice experiences outside of private law firms had no appreci-
able effect on teaching constitutional law. The correlation be-
tween public interest experience and teaching constitutional law, 
evident in my initial analyses, disappeared when I controlled for 
other variables. Educational credentials apart from the }.D.-
including master's degrees in law, master's degrees in other 
fields, and doctoral degrees-also failed to exert any significant 
influence on teaching constitutional law. 
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III. DISCUSSION 
My empirical analysis supports the assumption that constitu-
tional law is a desirable course awarded to highly qualified 
teaching applicants. Three top credentials (prestige of the J.D. 
school, experience as a court of appeals clerk, and experience as 
a Supreme Court clerk) showed a significant, positive partial cor-
relation with teaching constitutional law. A fourth such creden-
tial (service as a named editor of a main law review) displayed a 
positive relationship that approached significance. These results 
suggest that the most academically qualified applicants are able 
to bargain for and obtain assignments teaching constitutional 
law. 
I also found evidence that the opportunity to teach constitu-
tional law increases as a faculty member gains seniority. This re-
lationship is consistent with the theory that constitutional law is a 
desirable subject; professors may have to wait their turn to teach 
this course. Alternatively, the relationship between seniority and 
teaching constitutional law may simply reflect the fact that, as 
professors spend more years on a faculty, they add more courses 
to their repertoire.2s 
The regression equation also suggests that appellate clerk-
ships have a special relationship to teaching constitutional law. 
In part, this relationship reflects the elite nature of those clerk-
ships and the premium credentials they represent. The beneficial 
effect of appellate clerkships on teaching constitutional law, how-
ever, went beyond the most prestigious clerkships with U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices and court of appeals judges. Clerkships 
for state appellate judges also had a positive impact on teaching 
constitutional law that approached significance-while clerkships 
for federal district court judges showed no significant relation-
ship to teaching this course. Since state appellate clerkships as a 
class do not appear to carry more prestige than federal district 
court clerkships, appellate clerks may enjoy an edge in teaching 
constitutional law that extends beyond the bargaining power 
their elite clerkships confer.29 
28. Seniority, in other words, might also show a significant association with teaching 
corporations, trusts and estates, or any other course in the law school curriculum. 
29. The possible preference for state appellate clerks is also intriguing in light of a 
recent critique of constitutional law courses focusing on the almost exclusively federal 
nature of those courses. Daniel R. Gordon, The Demise of American Constitutionalism: 
Death by Legal Education, 16 S. Ill. U. LJ. 39 (1991). 
I can cite no empirical support for the speculation that state appellate clerkships are 
no more prestigious, as a class, than federal district court clerkships. The observation 
accords with my personal experience both in law school appointments and in providing 
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Several mechanisms could explain this relationship. The 
type of law student who seeks an appellate clerkship may be the 
same type of graduate who prefers to teach constitutional law. 
Alternatively, appellate clerkships may draw clerks into the intri-
cacies of constitutional law and impress them with the impor-
tance of that subject. Or hiring schools may believe that 
appellate clerks are particularly well suited to teaching constitu-
tional law. 
Whatever the mechanisms contributing to the positive asso-
ciation between appellate clerkships and teaching constitutional 
law, it is worth speculating about the possible effects of that rela-
tionship on the ways in which constitutional law is taught. Ap-
pellate clerks work in a relatively rarefied, theoretical arena. 
They help analyze cases in which the facts have already been 
thoroughly sorted and the issues sharply defined.3o Appellate 
clerks rarely meet litigants or their lawyers; appellate decision-
making takes place in chambers and conference rooms, well insu-
lated from the hurly-burly of trials, record making, and clients. 
With this background, it may be no accident that constitu-
tional law is among the most theoretical, appellate-oriented of 
the basic subjects taught in law school. In part, the predomi-
nance of appellate opinions in constitutional law courses is due to 
the Supreme Court's dominant role in deciding issues of constitu-
tional law. But all of those Supreme Court decisions had to start 
somewhere-in some office and some trial court. Do constitu-
tional law professors focus so heavily on the appellate outcome 
of these cases, not only because the Supreme Court provides so 
many opinions to analyze, but because of their own inclination to 
think like appellate lawyers or clerks?3I 
letters of recommendation to students interested in judicial clerkships. If state appellate 
clerkships are more prestigious than federal district court clerkships, then the relationship 
between the former clerkships and the teaching of constitutional law further confirms the 
desirability of that teaching assignment. 
30. Some appellate records, of course, are hopelessly muddled. As cases move from 
the law office through the courts, however, the issues they raise tend to become more 
clearly, and abstractly, defined. 
31. For similar critiques of constitutional law teaching, see Paul R. Baier, What Is the 
Use of a Law Book Without Pictures or Conversations?, 34 J. Legal Educ. 619 (1984); J.D. 
Hyman, Constitutional Jurisprudence and the Teaching of Constitutional Law, 28 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1271 (1976) (book review); Christopher D. Stone, Towards a Theory of Constitu-
tional Law Casebooks, 41 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1968). 
A few constitutional professors have begun to incorporate non-appellate materials, 
problem solving, and simulations into their courses. See, e.g., Robert P. Davidow, Teach-
ing Constitutional Law and Related Courses Through Problem-Solving and Role-Playing, 
34 J. Legal Educ. 527 (1984). Even when professors use these nontraditional approaches, 
however, they often focus on the appellate process. See, e.g., David S. Day, Teaching 
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In this connection, it is also noteworthy that law firm experi-
ence had a significant negative impact on the likelihood that a 
professor would teach constitutional law. Other practice exper-
iences (including government work, legal aid work, experience as 
a prosecutor or public defender, and work for any type of public 
interest organization) showed no significant relationship to 
teaching constitutional law when I controlled for other creden-
tials and personal characteristics.32 Why is law firm experience 
so uncongenial to professors of constitutional law? 
The question is particularly troubling because practice with a 
private law firm is by far the most common experience for law 
school graduates.33 The relative lack of law firm experience 
among constitutional law professors, therefore, tends to set them 
apart from both their colleagues and their students. Is there 
something about constitutional law that justifies this special sta-
tus? More important, does a lack of law firm experience affect 
the manner in which constitutional law is taught or analyzed by 
experts in that field? Would professors with law firm experience 
think differently about constitutional law than professors with 
other types of practice experience? 
The most startling and disturbing result of my regression 
analysis, however, is the significant negative relationship be-
tween being female and teaching constitutional law. Being fe-
male cut the odds that a recently hired professor would teach 
constitutional law in half-even after controlling for credentials 
and work experience.34 No other personal characteristic-in-
cluding race, age, or the sex-race interaction-significantly af-
fected the likelihood of teaching constitutional law.Js Why are 
Constitutional Law: Role-Playing the Supreme Court, 36 J. Legal Educ. 268 (1986) 
(describing course in which students play roles as Supreme Court Justices). 
32. But see infra note 38 and accompanying text, noting that experience working for 
a public interest employer had a positive impact on teaching constitutional Jaw that ap-
proached significance for men. 
33. Fifty-nine percent of 1992 Jaw school graduates took their first job with a private 
law firm. National Association for Law Placement, Class of 1992:Employment Report 
and Salary Survey 15 (1993). Over time, of course, an even larger percentage of Jaw 
school graduates experience Jaw firm practice as they leave judicial clerkships and other 
early work experiences. 
34. For the regression analysis reported in Table 2, the Exp(B) for being female was 
.59. The Exp(B) is "a multiplicative adjustment of the logistic regression coefficient" that 
is required to produce the odds that a woman would teach constitutional law compared to 
the odds that a man would teach the same course. S. Philip Morgan and Jay D. 
Teachman, Logistic Regression: Description, Examples, and Comparisons, 50 J. Marriage 
& Fam. 929, 932 (1988). 
35. The failure of the sex-race interaction to reach significance means that both wo-
men of color and white women were equally disadvantaged in obtaining assignments 
teaching constitutional law. Neither women of color nor men of color suffered any addi-
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women less likely than similarly qualified men to teach constitu-
tional law? 
There seems no reason to suspect that women dislike teach-
ing constitutional law or shy away from the course. Indeed, con-
stitutional law embraces many subjects (such as sex equality, 
abortion, and pornography) of clear interest to many female 
scholars. The apparent prestige of the subject, together with its 
opportunities for scholarship, prominent appellate advocacy, and 
public speaking, should make constitutional law attractive to 
both female and male professors. If women and men are equally 
interested in teaching constitutional law, then the sex discrepancy 
may arise from the manner in which law schools assign this 
course; schools may be more likely to offer this popular course to 
new male professors than to comparably qualified female ones.36 
In an effort to analyze this sex discrepancy further, I re-
peated my regression analysis for the two separate populations of 
male and female professors. The results of those analyses appear 
in Table 3. From these results, it is possible to discern whether 
particular credentials or experiences had a different impact on 
the teaching assignments of women and men. Such differences 
can then provide clues to possible explanations for the sex ine-
quality. 
As Table 3 shows, only one credential affected the likelihood 
of teaching constitutional law in a comparable manner for men 
and women: Supreme Court clerkships enhanced the likelihood 
that both women and men would teach constitutional law.37 
Other credentials and experiences seemed to affect women and 
men differently. Male professors were more likely to teach con-
stitutional law if they had clerked for a federal appellate judge or 
served as a named editor of a main law review. They also 
seemed more likely to teach constitutional law if they possessed 
seniority in law teaching or had worked for a public interest em-
ployer.3s Experience in a private law firm, conversely, signifi-
tiona) disadvantage (or offsetting advantage) because of their race, relative to same-sex 
peers. See also supra note 17. 
36. The greater seniority, on average, of men on law school faculties does not ex-
plain the sex discrepancy. Although seniority appears to enhance the likelihood of teach-
ing constitutional law, the sex difference emerged even after controlling for seniority. 
Within the relatively junior population I studied, moreover, the men were not signifi-
cantly more senior than the women. 
37. This coefficient merely approached significance for men, but it attained signifi-
cance at the conventional .05 level for women. 
38. The coefficients for both of these variables approached significance at the con-
ventional level. The latter credential, working for a public interest employer, had no sig-
nificant effect on teaching constitutional law when I analyzed the combined population of 
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Table 3 
Logistic Regression for Teaching Constitutional Law 
(Separating Male and Female Populations) 
Coefficient for Coefficient 
Variable Women for Men 
JD Prestige 
.33** .12 
Main Law Review Staff 
.28 .17 
Main Law Review Editor 
.34 .61* 
Secondary Law Review Staff 
- .67 .50 
Secondary Law Review Editor 
.45 - .08 
LLM 
- .32 .32 
MA 
- .32 - .24 
PhD 
.53 .17 
Supreme Court Clerkship 1.83* .95** 
Court of Appeals Clerkship .48 .84* 
District Court Clerkship 
.40 - .35 
State Appellate Clerkship .88 .57 
Law Firm Experience 
- .59 - .71* 
Solo Practice 
.22 -1.43 
Public Defender 
- .44 -1.43 
Prosecutor 
- .23 .38 
Government Work .22 - .28 
Public Interest Work 
- .83 .75** 
Research Job .35 .26 
Corporate Counsel 
-5.74 - .29 
Legal Aid 
- .97 .14 
Prestige of Tenure-Track Institution - .07 - .09 
Inbred .19 - .59 
Tenure-Track Year 
- .07 - .14** 
Age .03 - .01 
Minority .62 .35 
N 379 606 
• Statistically significant (a~ .05). 
•• Approaches significance (aS .10). 
cantly decreased the likelihood that a man would teach 
constitutional law. 
Women were not able to capitalize on either their court of 
appeals clerkships or law review editorships to obtain assign-
ments teaching constitutional law; neither of these factors even 
approached statistical significance for women. Nor did women 
women and men. For men alone, however, there appeared to be some relationship be-
tween public interest employment and teaching constitutional law. 
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enhance their opportunities to teach constitutional law by gain-
ing seniority on law faculties. On the other hand, prestige of the 
J.D. school approached significance for women but not for men; 
this factor seemed to increase the likelihood that a woman would 
teach constitutional law. Finally, practice experiences bore no 
significant relationship to teaching constitutional law for women. 
Experience in a law firm did not hurt women's chances in ob-
taining this assignment; nor did experience as a public interest 
lawyer help their oppportunities. 
This pattern suggests that, for women, top credentials are 
the key to teaching constitutional law. If a woman possesses the 
two strongest credentials in the teaching market-a Supreme 
Court clerkship and graduation from an elite law school-she 
can bargain to teach constitutionallaw.39 Without those creden-
tials, her odds of being shut out of the course are high. 
For men, the picture is more complex. Slightly less exalted 
credentials-such as a court of appeals clerkship or editorship on 
the main law review (even at a non-elite school)-may be 
enough to secure a berth teaching constitutional law. Gaining 
seniority on a law faculty also seems to yield opportunities for 
men to teach constitutional law.40 Practice experience, more-
over, appears to have some role in sorting men either into those 
who desire to teach constitutional law or those whom law schools 
believe are suitable to teach the course. This sorting process is 
less likely to occur with women; unless women have the very best 
credentials, they appear to lose out simply because they are 
women. 
Whatever more detailed explanations can be offered to ac-
count for the male/female discrepancy in teaching constitutional 
law, the bottom line remains disturbing. Teaching constitutional 
law offers myriad opportunities for scholarship, high profile ad-
39. Previous empirical studies have demonstrated that graduation from an elite law 
school is by far the most important factor in determining the prestige of the school at 
which a professor obtains a teaching position. See Borthwick and Schau, 25 U. Mich. J.L. 
Ref. at 226-32 (cited in note 5); Fossum, 1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J. at 516-17, 521 (cited 
in note 5). Empirical studies also support "the conventional wisdom that experience as a 
Supreme Court clerk is one of the most highly valued credentials for a professor." 
Borthwick and Schau, 25 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. at 217 (cited in note 5) (reporting that 
although only 5% of the law professors they studied had clerked for a Supreme Court 
Justice, 37% of the professors teaching at one of the top seven schools had this clerkship 
credential). 
40. Both the men and women in my population were relatively junior faculty mem-
bers; no professor had more than five years experience on the tenure track. Seniority, 
moreover, showed no correlation to being male in this population of recent tenure-track 
hires. The effect of seniority for men, but not women, therefore, is not due to the fact 
that men possessed more seniority. 
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vocacy, and public visibility. The very relationship between top 
academic credentials and assignments teaching constitutional law 
suggests that the subject is a prized one, enjoying considerable 
prestige among academics. By not having the same opportunity 
as men to teach constitutional law, women lose an opportunity 
for professional advancement that is extended to men with com-
parable credentials and experience. 
Equally troubling, diminished opportunities for women to 
teach constitutional law may affect both the substance of consti-
tutional scholarship and the decisions courts render in this field. 
Suzanna Sherry has argued that female judges approach issues-
especially constitutional ones-from a different perspective than 
men.41 If this is true, then the bias against women teaching con-
stitutional law may distort both the type of constitutional scholar-
ship faculties produce and the judicial decisions influenced by 
that scholarship. 
Even if further studies do not bear out Sherry's thesis that 
women think differently than men about constitutional law, it is 
at least plausible that female scholars stress different constitu-
tional topics than their male colleagues. It is probably not coinci-
dence, for example, that Ruth Bader Ginsburg (rather than one 
of her male colleagues) developed a constitutional framework for 
attacking sex discrimination and pressed that theory on the 
Supreme Court. If women and men enjoyed equal opportunities 
to teach constitutional law, the focus of constitutional theory 
might change further. 
The apparent bias against women teaching constitutional 
law, therefore, threatens the fabric of constitutional law itself. 
Unless both women and men-together with scholars represent-
ing a diversity of other backgrounds-have equal opportunities 
to teach and study constitutional law, we cannot be sure that the 
Constitution achieves its end of representing all people in our 
society. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Empirical analysis suggests that professors of constitutional 
law are not randomly drawn from a larger pool of new tenure-
track hires. Instead, constitutional law professors are more likely 
41. Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 72 Va. L. Rev. 543 (1986); Suzanna Sherry, The Gender of Judges, 4 J.L. & lneq. 159 
(1986). Other writers have also speculated about differences between female and male 
judges. See, e.g., Gretchen H. Schoff, Women, Justice, and Judgment, 4 J.L. & Ineq. 137 
(1986). 
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than other new professors to be male, to have graduated from a 
prestigious law school, to have clerked for a Supreme Court Jus-
tice or court of appeals judge, and to have avoided private law 
firm practice. There is also some evidence that professors of con-
stitutional law are more likely to have served as a named editor 
of a main law review, to have clerked for a state appellate court, 
and to have served more years in tenure-track teaching. 
These patterns raise questions about the way in which law 
schools assign professors to teach constitutional law. Is the 
strong link between appellate clerkships and constitutional law 
justified? Should law schools make a greater effort to assign con-
stitutional law courses to professors with experience practicing 
with a private law firm? And why have law schools been less 
willing to assign constitutional law courses to women than to 
comparably qualified men? The people who teach constitutional 
law define the constitutional law that is taught;42 law schools 
must now make more deliberative decisions about who teaches 
this influential course. 
42. See Sanford Levinson, Authorizing Constitutional Text: On the Purported 
Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 11 Const. Comm. 101 (1994). 
